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Abstract
This paper compares the performance of two prominent non-Bayesian regulatory mechanisms: Sap-
pington and Sibley’s (1988) Incremental Surplus Subsidy (ISS) and Hagerman’s (1990) refinement of
the Vogelsang-Finsinger (1979) mechanism.  The two mechanisms are shown to induce identical,
non-zero levels of “abuse”—unproductive expenses that benefit the firm—though neither induces pure
waste.  ISS pareto-dominates the Hagerman mechanism when lump-sum transfers to the firm are
non-distortionary, but the Hagerman mechanism generates greater welfare and consumer surplus when
the distortionary effects of transfers are large.  For a wide range of intermediate parameter values, the
quantitative difference in performance between the two mechanisms is surprisingly modest.
1.  Introduction
Regulating a monopoly is made difficult by the regulator’s lack of information about the
firm’s cost and demand functions.  If the regulator knows the firm’s cost function up to a
parametric form, it can in principle design an optimal (Bayesian) mechanism along agency-
theoretic lines.2 Even if the regulator does not know the form of the firm’s cost function,
however, non-Bayesian (“anonymous”) mechanisms can be employed. These mechanisms
consist of simple price-adjustment rules that can be applied by regulators who can observe
accounting data but lack probability estimates about parameters of the firm’s cost function.
Recently, several authors3 have shown it is possible to design non-Bayesian mechanisms
that guide the firm to an eventual state of productive and allocative efficiency when cost and
demand functions are static.4 Practical interest in these and other forms of “incentive
1 This paper has benefited from the comments of Keith Crocker, Steve Hackett, John Mayo, David Sibley,
Ted Stefos, Lester Taylor, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the 1992 American
Economic Association meetings, the Tenth Annual Eastern Conference of the Rutgers University Center
for Research in Regulated Industries, the Pennsylvania State University, GTE Laboratories, and the
Management Science Group, Department of Veterans Affairs, Bedford, Massachusetts.
2 Baron (1989) provides an excellent overview of the mechanism design literature.
3 Important examples include the papers by Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979), Loeb and Magat (1979),
Sappington and Sibley (1988), and Hagerman (1990).  In addition, Bawa and Sibley (1980) show that the
stochastic nature of regulatory review under rate-of-return regulation can induce efficient behavior in the
long run if demand and cost functions are static.
4 Blackmon (1992) shows that moral hazard (or “abuse,” as he calls it) may remain a problem.  Abuse is
regulation” has been spreading throughout the regulated industries, including the telecom-
munications, energy, and health care sectors.5
Given the variety of non-Bayesian mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature,
there has been a surprising lack of comparative analysis of alternative mechanisms.  This
paper takes a first step toward filling this void.  I examine two prominent non-Bayesian
mechanisms: Sappington and Sibley’s (1988) Incremental Surplus Subsidy scheme and
Hagerman’s (1990) refinement of the Vogelsang-Finsinger (1979) mechanism.  (I refer to
these papers below by the abbreviations ISS and H, respectively.) The two mechanisms
improve upon the performance of rate-of-return regulation by altering the frequency of rate
review and expanding the regulator’s power to include the use of taxes or subsidies.  By
holding rate reviews every period, the regulator can eliminate the firm’s incentives to pad
costs just before a rate review.  In addition, the regulator can use taxes or subsidies to tie
profits to increases in output, thereby inducing the firm to cut prices and produce efficiently.
Both mechanisms converge to productive and allocative efficiency in a static environment
without moral hazard problems.  
The main contribution of this paper lies in its assessment of the relative performance of
the mechanisms when moral hazard problems are present and making transfers to the firm
is costly.  I show that the two mechanisms are equally vulnerable to “abuse,” (non-productive
expenses that benefit the firm) though both are immune to “pure waste” (non-productive
expenses that provide no direct utility to the firm).  I also show that ISS is more sensitive
than H to changes in the cost of financing.  The combination of a high level of abuse (which
raises the need for transfers to the firm) and high financing costs is particularly damaging to
ISS.  By focusing on the case of a single-product firm facing a linear demand curve, I can
solve explicitly for the price paths under the two mechanisms and make precise quantitative
comparisons of their performance.  I show that ISS Pareto-dominates H when transfer
payments to the firm can be raised in a non-distortionary manner, but H generates greater
consumer surplus and total welfare when the distortionary effects of transfers are sizable.
Thus, if the demand for access to the regulated firm’s system is highly inelastic (as is likely
to be the case for utility services6), then access fees can be used to finance the firm with the
loss of relatively few low-demand customers from the system; in this case, ISS should
produce greater welfare than H.  On the other hand, when a large portion of the firm’s
financing comes from cross-subsidies (as exemplified by the cross-subsidy from long-dis-
tance to local telephone service7), transfers to the firm are highly distortionary and H should
produce greater welfare than ISS.
The following section briefly summarizes the two mechanisms analyzed here.  Section 3
then examines the level of productive efficiency induced by the mechanisms, focusing on
their potential for abuse.  Section 4 compares their allocative efficiency, highlighting the
effects of fixed costs, abuse, and costly financing on mechanism performance.  Section 5
concludes.
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discussed further is section 3 below.
5 For a survey, see Lyon (1994).
6 Cain and MacDonald (1991) provide a recent estimate for telephone service.
7 For an interesting discussion, see Kaserman and Mayo (1994a).
2.  Two Non-Bayesian Mechanisms
The literature on non-Bayesian mechanisms has emerged from the pioneering work of Loeb
and Magat (1979) and Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979).8 In each of these papers, if costs and
demand are static the firm converges to productive efficiency (assuming that the only
divergence from efficiency is purely wasteful expenditures designed to manipulate the
regulatory process) and to either marginal-cost prices (L-M) or Ramsey prices (V-F).
However, the avenues through which these anonymous mechanisms achieve their results
differ. Loeb and Magat propose a one-time subsidy to the firm which gives it the entire social
surplus.  Vogelsang and Finsinger, in contrast, propose a price adjustment mechanism that
“ratchets” down the prices of a multi-product monopolist over time: at each rate review, a
Laspeyre’s index of the firm’s new prices, with weights equal to the previous period’s
quantities, can be no greater than the previous period’s realized expenditures.  
Each of these schemes has shortcomings.  L-M has severe distributional consequences,
and is also difficult to implement.9 V-F gives the firm incentives for strategic waste in early
periods; in fact, waste may be so severe that the V-F mechanism generates lower total surplus
than unregulated monopoly.10 However, as described below, each of the mechanisms has
been refined in a way that eliminates its worst defects.
2.1.  The Incremental Surplus Subsidy (Sappington and Sibley)
Under the Loeb and Magat (1979) mechanism, the regulator promises to write a check to
the firm in the amount of the total consumer surplus generated by any price changes the firm
makes; as a result the firm moves to marginal-cost pricing.  Sappington and Sibley (1988)
propose a refinement of this mechanism: while the earlier authors allowed the firm to keep
any surplus increases forever, Sappington and Sibley tax them away from the firm after one
period.  Sappington and Sibley refer to their scheme as the Incremental Surplus Subsidy
(ISS) scheme, since under it the firm’s profits in each period are equal to the net increase in
total surplus over the previous period.  This is accomplished by giving the firm a subsidy






Rt = ptq(pt) − C(q(pt)) − Wt .
The firm’s demand and cost functions are q(p) and C(q), while pt and Wt are price and waste
in period t.  The component ψt transfers to the firm the increase in consumer surplus
generated by a change in the firm’s prices, while Rt−1 takes away the earnings obtained by
the firm in the previous period.11
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8 Bawa and Sibley’s (1980) analysis of rate-of-return regulation may also be seen as a non-Bayesian
mechanism.  It is difficult to compare to the other mechanisms examined here, however, since regulatory
lag is stochastic in their model, and they do not allow the use of taxes and subsidies.
9 See Sharkey (1979).
10 See Sappington (1980).
11 Note that by requiring the regulator to calculate ψt, this scheme utilizes more information about the firm’s
Under ISS, the firm never has incentives to incur purely wasteful expenditures, since these
reduce the incremental increase in total surplus; thus, Wt = 0 for all t. In addition, the firm
prices at marginal cost in all periods after the mechanism is instituted.  When there is no
possibility of moral hazard, the scheme is first-best except that it requires an initial (possibly
distortionary) lump-sum payment to the firm to induce it to move to marginal-cost pricing.12
2.2  Price Adjustment with a “Service Market” (Hagerman)
Under the V-F mechanism, when rate review occurs, the regulator approves any rate
proposal that is consistent with the following rule:
(pt − pt+1)q(pt) ≥ Rt , (1)
where earnings are Rt ≡ ptq(pt) − C(q(pt)) − Wt.  Repeated application of this scheme guides
the firm to efficient pricing and production, but may induce wasteful cost padding by the
firm.
Hagerman (1990) provides a refinement of the V-F mechanism that uses lump-sum
transfers to eliminate the firm’s incentives for strategic waste.  The key to his scheme is the
introduction of a “service market” whose quantity is defined equal to unity and whose price
in each period is included in the price adjustment constraint (1).  Hagerman shows that in a
static environment strategic waste is eliminated, even if transfers from the regulator to the
firm are constrained to be non-positive.13
While the mechanism eventually converges to Ramsey pricing (if service payments are
constrained to be non-negative) or marginal-cost pricing (if service payments are uncon-
strained14), the firm has an incentive to delay convergence.  The pattern of prices in a
two-period model is illustrated in figure 1. Prior to the imposition of the mechanism there is
a pre-reform price p0.  If the firm were to lower price to unit cost c in periods 1 and 2, it
would make profits of zero in both periods.  On the other hand, if it lowers price only to p1
in the first period, and then to c in the second period, it makes first-period profits (net of the
service payment) of π1 = (C + D) − C = D, and zero profits in the second period.  Thus, delay
of convergence is profitable as the firm gradually lowers price and increases quantity.
It is interesting to compare this scheme with that proposed by Sappington and Sibley.  ISS
“bribes” the firm to reduce prices by allowing it to keep the increment in total surplus for
one period; in terms of figure 1, the firm receives a subsidy of B + D + E for one period, and
in return immediately lowers price to marginal cost.  Hagerman, on the other hand, gives the
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demand function than does the Hagerman mechanism.  However, ISS has been refined by Sibley (1989) to
address the case where the regulator has no information about the firm’s demand function.  The
refinement is implemented by having the firm offer optional two-part tariffs.
12 Sappington and Sibley point out that if the regulator knows the firm’s discount factor, then the net
payment to the firm can be made arbitrarily small.  This refinement is not pursued in the present paper,
however, since the Hagerman mechanism does not assume the regulator knows the firm’s discount factor.
13 The logic behind the elimination of waste expenditures is simple.  Suppose that in some period t th  firm
incurs waste expenditures Wt to reduce its period t earnings and relax the price adjustment constraint in
period t+1. It can achieve exactly the same relaxation of the constraint by increasing the “service
payment” in period t+1 by Wt, thereby deferring the reduction in earnings by one period.  Thus, waste is
never optimal.
14 Service payments are assumed unconstrained throughout this paper, to facilitate comparison with ISS.
firm a weaker immediate incentive to lower prices (the firm only collects area D in the first
period), but does not require a lump-sum transfer to the firm; price does not move as quickly
to marginal cost, but consumers are spared the large “bribe” in the initial period.
3.  Productive Efficiency of the Mechanisms
As mentioned above, neither mechanism induces purely wasteful expenditures on the part
of the firm.  However, Blackmon (1992) has shown that the ISS mechanism is vulnerable to
moral hazard problems.  He focuses on the possibility that the firm might undertake
expenditures on “abuse” which, like waste, is unproductive, but unlike waste provides direct
benefits to the firm.  Let At be expenditures on abuse, which provide benefits B(At) for the
firm, and let β be the firm’s discount factor.  It is assumed that B(At) < At, 0 ≤ B′ ≤ 1, and
B′′ ≤ 0.  Waste, then, is the extreme case of abuse where B(A) = 0 for all A.  Blackmon shows
that the level of abuse under ISS is the solution to B′(At) = 1 − β, and thus is constant over
time.
Hagerman does not consider the possibility of abuse.  The following proposition identifies
the level of abuse that occurs under the Hagerman mechanism.
Proposition 1.  When the service payment under the Hagerman mechanism is unconstrained
in sign, the level of abuse in each period, At, is the solution to B′(At) = 1 − β, as it
is under ISS.
Figure 1.  Illustrative Cost and Price Path for Hagerman Mechanism
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Proof: See Appendix 2. Q.E.D.
Thus, abuse constitutes an additional fixed cost that is invariant with time and that is the
same under either mechanism.  Clearly, the level of abuse falls when the firm discounts the
future more heavily (i.e., β decreases): expenditures on abuse must be incurred today, but
will not be reimbursed until tomorrow.  In addition, the more rapidly the marginal benefits
of abuse diminish, the lower is the level of abuse.  Given Proposition 1, in the following
section expenditures on abuse will be treated simply as an increase in the firm’s fixed costs.
4.  Allocative Efficiency of the Mechanisms
In order to fairly compare the two mechanisms, I make the following assumptions throughout
this section: (a) regulatory reform is imposed upon the unsuspecting firm in period 1 after
an initial period with pre-reform price p0, (b) the firm’s costs are C(q) = cq + F, where the
fixed cost F includes both abuse and normal production costs, (c) the firm’s demand is
q(p) = a − bp, (d) the regulator can make transfers to and from the firm, and (e) there is a
non-negative “shadow cost” of financing, denoted by s, so that each dollar transferred to the
firm has costs $(1 + s).15 
Representative price paths under each of the mechanisms are shown in figure 2.  The price
Figure 2.  Price Paths for H and ISS
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15 The sources of this cost, and estimates of its magnitude, are presented in section 4.3 below.
path under ISS is simple: price moves to marginal cost immediately after the initial period.
The price path under the Hagerman mechanism is more complex; Appendix 1 shows that
when service payments are not constrained to be non-negative, price under H declines
geometrically to marginal cost.16 By leaving service payments unconstrained, assumption
(d) above ensures that comparisons between ISS and H are not simply picking up the
difference between marginal-cost prices and Ramsey prices.
Section 4.1 presents some basic analytical expressions for discounted profits and con-
sumer surplus under second-best pricing and under the two mechanisms considered here.
Section 4.2 analyzes the performance of the two mechanisms when transfers to the firm are
costless, presenting both analytical results and some illustrative numerical calculations.
Section 4.3 assesses mechanism performance when transfers to the firm are costly; in this
case, analytical results are unavailable, so a variety of numerical results are presented to show
the range of possible outcomes.
4.1.  Basic Welfare Measures
The performance measures on which I focus are profits, consumer surplus, and their sum,
which I refer to as “welfare.” With linear demand q(p) = a − bp and total costs
C(q) = F + cq, the static monopoly price is pM = (a + bc) ⁄ 2b, and monopoly profits are
πM = (a − bc)2 ⁄ 4b − F.  Marginal-cost  pr icing yields per-period welfare of
ω∗ ≡ (a − bc)2 ⁄ 2b, while monopoly pricing yields per-period welfare of ωM = 3ω∗ ⁄ 4.
The Second Best with Full Information   Consistent with the mechanisms analyzed here,
I assume the firm uses linear pricing, and the regulator can make lump -sum transfers to the
firm.  When s = 0, marginal-cost pricing is optimal, so pt = c for all t, and the firm’s fixed
cost is covered by a transfer from the regulator.  When s > 0, marginal-cost pricing is no
longer optimal.  Instead, Ramsey pricing is used to determine the optimal markup over









where ε = − q′(p)p ⁄ q(p) is the elasticity of demand.17 Note that this rule implies that the
firm’s profits are zero; if revenues exceed costs at pSB, then the regulator collects any excess
revenues through lump-sum transfer, while if costs exceed revenues the regulator gives the
firm just enough money to break even.  With linear demand, the second-best price is 
pSB = 
as ⁄ (1+s) + bc
b(1 + 2s) ⁄ (1 + s)
 .
The resulting net present value of welfare (and consumer surplus) under this pricing rule is
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16 While it would be interesting to derive the price path under H for constant elasticity demand as well as
linear demand, the dynamic price equations in Appendix 1 cannot be solved in closed form for this case.
17 See Laffont and Tirole (1993, 131-134) for a derivation and discussion.  As discussed in section 4.3





































Incremental Surplus Subsidy   The net present value (NPV) of outcomes under ISS is easy
to compute.  In period 1, the firm is granted a subsidy of (b ⁄ 2) (p0 − c)
2 + F, which induces





 (p0 − c)
2.
(3)
The cost to consumer/taxpayers of the subsidy is (1 + s) [(b ⁄ 2) (p0 − c)2 + F].  Assuming
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2 − (1 + s) F
1 − β
 . (5)
Hagerman   Because of the H mechanism’s geometric series of prices, welfare calculations
are somewhat more complicated for it than for ISS.  For this mechanism,

























































where λ ≡ (1 ⁄ β) [1 − √1 − β ].  (See Appendix 1 for a derivation of λ.)
While a general comparison of (3)–(5) with (6)–(8) is difficult, it is possible to establish
several results for the case of s = 0, as shown in the following section.
4.2.  Allocative Efficiency with Costless Transfers
This section presents three propositions comparing the performance of the two mecha-
nisms when transfers to the firm are non-distortionary.  Numerical calculations are then
presented showing the effect of changes in the discount factor β and the level of fixed costs
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F on mechanism performance.
Proposition 2.  Suppose the shadow cost of transfers is zero, and β ∈ (0,1).  Then (a)
ΠISS > ΠH, (b) WISS > WH, and (c) CSISS > (<) CSH if β > (<) .5.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Proposition 2 shows that if β > .5, the performance of the ISS mechanism Pareto-domi-
nates that of the H mechanism if subsidy funds can be raised in a non-distortionary manner.
Both the firm and its consumers can be made better off by using ISS rather than H.  The
relative advantage of ISS varies systematically with several parameters of the regulatory
environment, as shown in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3.  Suppose the shadow cost of transfers is zero.  Then ΠISS − ΠH and
WISS − WH are (a) increasing in the initial price p0, (b) increasing in the absolute
value of the slope of the demand curve b, and (c) decreasing in the firm’s marginal
cost c.  If β > .5, then (a)−(c) hold for consumer surplus as well. 
Proof:  See Appendix 2. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 shows that the relative value of ISS increases when the pre-reform price
p0 is high, when the demand curve is steep, and when marginal cost is low.  A larger price-cost
margin increases the rents of the firm prior to reform, and increases the value of effective
regulation.  In addition, the effect of b can be seen in figure 1.  Under the Hagerman
mechanism, the firm delays convergence of price to marginal cost by gradually lowering
price and expanding output.  The larger is b, the flatter is the inverse demand curve, and the
longer the firm can continue to expand output.  Thus, large b makes the Hagerman mecha-
nism relatively less effective.  Since elasticity ε = − q′(p)p ⁄ q(p) = bp ⁄ (a − bp) is increasing
in b, it might also be said that H is less efficient for elastic demand.
With one additional mild assumption, the relative efficiency of ISS and H can be bounded,
as shown in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4.  Suppose the shadow cost of transfers is zero, and that the firm would be
viable as an unregulated monopoly, i.e., (pM − c)q(pM) − F ≥ 0.  Then
WH ⁄ WISS ≥ .875.
Proof:  See Appendix 2. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 shows that when s = 0 and fixed costs are not “too high,” H produces at
least 87.5% of the welfare generated by ISS, for any values of a, b, c, and p0.  Equation (16)
in the proof can also be used to calculate the minimum welfare of H relative to ISS for any
given discount factor.  Thus, for β = 0.8, H generates at least 92.3% of WISS while for
β = 0.9, it generates at least 94.0% of WISS. Additional quantitative measures of the advantage
of ISS over H are provided in the following two tables.
Table 1 presents a set of “benchmark” results assuming the initial price is at the
unregulated monopoly level, there is no shadow cost of funds, and the firm has no fixed
costs, i.e., p0 = pM = (a + bc) ⁄ 2b and s = F = 0.  Note that when the pre-reform price is the
monopoly price, welfare results do not depend upon the parameters a, b, or c.  The focus in
table 1 is on changes in the discount factor (and the associated discount rate, denoted by
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r = (1 − β) ⁄ β).  Note that choosing the appropriate discount rate is not straightforward, since
the length of a period might be anywhere from a month to several years.  Regulators have
incentives to make the periods brief to encourage faster convergence, but shorter periods
(and therefore higher discount factors) also encourage more abuse, as shown in Proposition
1.  Since the issue of determining the optimal length of a period is beyond the scope of this
paper, table 1 reports results for a wide range of discount factors. 
In examining the table, one quickly sees that for β > 0.5 ISS generates greater welfare and
consumer surplus than H, as shown by Proposition 2.  Nevertheless, although the time pattern
of prices (and thus of surplus) under the two mechanisms is completely different, they
generate net present values that are surprisingly similar.  ISS achieves first-best levels of
total surplus, but with no fixed costs H performs better than the minimal level computed in
Proposition 4, with total surplus levels greater than 96% of the first-best level for discount
rates of 25% or less.  Consumer surplus levels differ even less, no more than 2.3% for
r ≤ 25%.  As shown in Proposition 2, H generates greater consumer surplus than ISS for
β < 0.5 (such as might be the case if the interval between periods were on the order of five
years), though the difference is relatively small.
When s = 0, the mechanisms are only moderately sensitive to changes in the parameters
a, b, c, p0, and F.  From Proposition 3, increasing c or reducing p0 below the monopoly level
will improve the relative performance of H, and indeed, as c ri es or p0 falls, the welfare
performance of the two mechanisms gradually converges.  However, as table 1 shows, these
differences are not large to begin with.  Nor do changes in a or b produce striking changes
in welfare.  Fixed costs are worth examining, however, since even when p0 = pM(c) they
affect the performance of H.  They are also of interest because they reflect the firm’s
expenditures on abuse.  Changes in F, as a percentage of monopoly earnings
Table 1.  Numerical Results for p0 = pM(c) and s = F = 0
Fraction of First-Best
Welfare Achieved
Consumer Surplus Share of
First-Best Welfare
β r ISS H ISS H
.95 5.3% 1.00 .977 .988 .967
.90 11.1% 1.00 .970 .975 .951
.85 17.6% 1.00 .965 .962 .938
.80 25.0% 1.00 .961 .950 .927
.75 33.3% 1.00 .958 .937 .917
.70 42.9% 1.00 .956 .925 .907
.65 53.8% 1.00 .954 .912 .899
.60 66.7% 1.00 .951 .900 .890
.55 81.8% 1.00 .950 .888 .882
.50 100.0% 1.00 .948 .875 .875
.45 122.2% 1.00 .947 .862 .868
.40 150.0% 1.00 .946 .850 .861
.35 185.7% 1.00 .944 .838 .854
.30 233.0% 1.00 .943 .825 .848
.25 300.0% 1.00 .942 .812 .842
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EM ≡ [pM(c) − c]q(pM(c)), are reported in table 2.  Fixed costs are presented in this fashion
since for any scalar α, if p0 = pM(c) and F = αEM, then the relative performance of the
mechanisms is unaffected by a,b, or c.  As the table shows, changes in F have a modest effect
on mechanism performance.  This effect is more pronounced for consumer surplus, which,
for H and ISS respectively, may fall to as low as 90.2% or 95% of the first-best level of
welfare.  Note that even though the two mechanisms induce the same level of abuse, such
expenditures have less impact on the efficiency of ISS because fixed costs under ISS are
assumed to be covered by non-distortionary lump-sum transfers.
The results of this section show clearly that ISS Pareto-dominates H when transfers to the
firm are costless.  The difference in relative performance need not be great, however; even
in the worst-case scenario, H generates at least 87.5% as much total surplus as ISS.
Furthermore, numerical results indicate that the difference in performance across the mecha-
nisms may be surprisingly small given the very different price paths they generate.  
4.3.  Allocative Efficiency when Transfers are Costly
The above results provide a much clearer comparison of the two mechanisms than has
been previously available.  Nevertheless, they are built upon a suspect assumption: that
lump-sum transfers to the firm are non-distortionary. This section relaxes the assumption of
non-distortionary financing.  The general impact of distortionary transfers on the two
mechanisms studied here is clear.  The effects of a positive shadow cost will fall more heavily
on the ISS mechanism, since it relies upon a subsidy to induce the firm to price at marginal
cost.  The performance of the H mechanism, in contrast, may actually be improved when the
shadow cost of transfers is recognized, since H often generates lump-sum payments to the
regulator that can be used to offset other revenue requirements.  The relative size of these
effects is difficult to assess analytically, so this section presents numerical results comparing
the two mechanisms under a variety of different circumstances.  First, however, a reasonable
range of estimates for the shadow cost of transfers is established.
The Distortionary Effects of Lump-Sum Transfers   Lump-sum transfers play a critical
role in both of the mechanisms considered here.  Such transfers are generally thought to
promote efficiency, since they do not directly distort the prices and consumption of individual
.20 400.0% 1.00 .941 .800 .835
.15 566.7% 1.00 .941 .788 .830
.10 900.0% 1.00 .940 .776 .824











F   ISS H ISS H
0% 1.000 .970 .975 .951
10% 1.000 .968 .974 .948
20% 1.000 .967 .972 .946
30% 1.000 .965 .971 .942
40% 1.000 .962 .969 .939
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goods and services.  In regulated industries, however, transfers to the firm generally cannot
be accomplished costlessly: a $1 transfer to the firm typically creates an associated dead-
weight loss s. As Laffont and Tirole (1993, 37) point out, the deadweight loss from transfers
may arise from a number of different sources.  For a public enterprise, s represents the
distortionary effects of raising revenues through the tax system.  For a private enterprise that
must cover its own revenue requirements via one-part prices, s is the shadow cost of the
firm’s budget constraint.  For a private firm that is financed in part through cross-subsidies,
as local exchange carriers are subsidized by long-distance service, s epr sents the distortions
caused by further regulatory “taxation” in the subsidizing market.  Finally, for a private firm
that covers its costs using two-part tariffs, s represents the deadweight loss when low-demand
customers are driven off the system by increases in the non-usage sensitive portion of the
tariff.
For the case of funds raised through broad-based taxation, Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley
(1985, 128) used a computable general equilbrium model to estimate the shadow cost of
public funds, which they found to be “in the range of 17 to 56 cents per dollar of extra
revenue.” Laffont and Tirole (1993, 38) suggest “a reasonable mean estimate for the United
States economy seems to be [s] = 0.3.” 
Of more immediate impact in United States telecommunications is the cross-subsidy from
long-distance to local service, which Kaserman and Mayo (1994a, 131) estimate may
approach $20 billion annually for the United States as a whole.  This form of “taxation by
regulation”18 has been estimated to generate deadweight losses of $1.5 to $10 billion
annually.19 A simple back-of-the envelope calculation for this case yields a rough estimate
of s.  Consider the change in total surplus when “tax” revenues from long-distance service
are increased.  Let p be the firm’s price net of tax, t be the per-unit tax, Q(p + t) be demand
and W be the sum of profit and consumer surplus.  Then T = tQ(p + t) is total tax revenues.











where c is marginal cost and ε is price elasticity.  In the case of long-distance telephone
service, a rough estimate is that c = t = $0.12,20 ε = −0.6,21 and p + t = $0.24,22 so p = $0.12.
Then dW ⁄ dT = −1.43 and s = .43.23 (when c/p = 1).
If the number of customers is fixed and totally inelastic, then financing can be accom-
plished without distortion through the use of access fees, and marginal-cost pricing remains
optimal.24 If access fees reduce the number of customers, however, then such fees create
52 THOMAS P. LYON
18 Posner (1971) is the seminal article for this perspective on regulation.
19 See Kaserman and Mayo (1994a, 127) for further discussion.
20 Kaserman and Mayo (1994a, 127).
21 See Griffin (1982).
22 Kaserman and Mayo (1994b, 99).
23 This is consistent with Griffin’s (1982) estimate of welfare losses in the range of s = .4 (when c/p = 2) to s
= 1.
another set of distortions.  A number of authors have estimated access elasticities to be quite
small.  For example, Cain and MacDonald (1991) estimate this value at between -.048 and
-.271 for local telephone service.  The associated deadweight loss is difficult to compute
precisely, since it is contingent on the distribution of customer types from low to high
demand; a rough estimate is possible, however.  Taylor (1994, 151,161) notes that with
semi-logarithmic demand, consumer surplus is simply S = q ⁄ α, where q is quantity de-
manded; he also cites an estimate of α = −2.79.  Since the customers likely to be driven off
the system are those with the least usage, suppose q = 30 phone calls per month.  Such
customers then receive consumer surplus of $10.75/month.  The externalities provided by
one user to other customers on the system were estimated by Perl (1983) to be $4/month in
1983, or roughly $6/month today.  Thus, suppose that each customer driven off the system
generates a welfare loss of about $17/month.  Now let a b  the monthly access fee, N(a) be
the number of customers, A = aN(a) be total access revenues, and η be the elasticity of access.
Then dN ⁄ dA = η ⁄ [a(1 + η)].  Taking from Cain and MacDonald (1991) values of a = $7.5
and η = −0.05, one finds dN ⁄ dA = .007.  Multiplying this by $17 generates a marginal
welfare loss of s = .12 from a marginal increase in A.25
The above estimates, while suggestive rather than definitive, indicate that financing
lump-sum transfers to a regulated firm is not costless, and that reasonable estimates of s may
range anywhere from .05 to .56.  
Performance Comparisons   Table 3 examines the effects of alternative shadow costs of
transfers when the firm has no fixed costs. Again, I assume p0 = pM(c), so that the results are
invariant for all a, b, and c.  Note that with s > 0, the appropriate welfare benchmark is no
longer marginal-cost pricing, but Ramsey pricing using the shadow cost of transfers.
Table 3 shows that the welfare superiority of ISS quickly evaporates when transfers are
distortionary.  For low levels of the shadow cost s, ISS continues to outperform H.  However,
50% 1.000 .960 .967 .935
60% 1.000 .957 .964 .930
70% 1.000 .954 .962 .925
80% 1.000 .950 .958 .918
90% 1.000 .945 .955 .911
100% 1.000 .940 .950 .902
Table 3.  Numerical Results for p0 = pM(c), β = 0.9, and F = 0
Fraction of Second-Best
Welfare Achieved
Consumer Surplus Share of
Second-Best Welfare
s ISS H ISS H
0.00 1.000  .970 .975 .951
0.06 .995 .977 .970 .958
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24 This is the assumption in Sibley (1989).
25 This estimate is somewhat higher than Griffin’s estimate of s = .05 for revenues raised in the local market.
for s ∈ [.18,.54] the Hagerman mechanism consistently outperforms ISS.  The reason is not
hard to see.  As the cost of transfers rises, the subsidy to the firm under ISS becomes
increasingly costly to society; at the same time, the service payments that H collects from
the firm become increasingly valuable as means of reducing transfers to the firm.  Thus, it
is not surprising that the relative performance of H improves when s > 0.  What is striking
in table 3 is that H outperforms ISS for most of the plausible range of estimates for s.
Given the sharp results in table 3, one would like to understand better the performance of
the mechanisms when the firm’s fixed costs are non-zero. Table 4 revises table 3 for the case
where fixed costs are equal to monopoly earnings, so F = EM.
A comparison of tables 4 and 3 shows dramatically the enhanced importance of the
shadow cost of transfers when the firm’s fixed production costs are high or abuse is severe.
Again, ISS outperforms H for s ≤ .12, but for all higher values of s, H dominates ISS.  The
change from table 3, however, is that the potential deterioration of performance is now much
more severe.  If s= .54, ISS generates for consumers only 52% of the second-best level of
welfare.  In this case, the Hagerman mechanism produces consumer surplus that is over 40%
greater than that of ISS.  For the more probable case where s = 0.3, ISS still produces
consumer surplus of only 78% of the second-best welfare level, and total welfare of only
84% of the second-best level.  The Hagerman mechanism does somewhat better, generating
0.12 .986 .978 .961 .959
0.18 .972 .976 .948 .957
0.24 .957 .971 .933 .953
0.30 .940 .964 .916 .946
0.36 .922 .956 .898 .938
0.42 .903 .947 .880 .930
0.48 .884 .937 .862 .920
0.54 .865 .927 .843 .910
Table 4.  Numerical Results for p0 = pM(c), β = 0.9, F = 100% of monopoly earnings
Fraction of Second-Best
Welfare Achieved
Consumer Surplus Share of
Second-Best Welfare
s ISS H ISS H
0.00 1.000  .940 .950 .902
0.06 .990 .950 .937 .910
0.12 .968 .951 .912 .909
0.18 .935 .943 .877 .899
0.24 .893 .928 .833 .882
0.30 .843 .907 .782 .860
0.36 .787 .880 .723 .832
0.42 .724 .849 .660 .800
0.48 .657 .814 .591 .764
0.54 .585 .775 .517 .724
Table 5.  Numerical Results for p0 = pM(c), β = 0.9, and s = 0.3




Consumer Surplus Share of
Second-Best Welfare
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consumer surplus and total surplus, respectively, of 86% and 91% of second-best welfare
when s = 0.3.
To assess the sensitivity of these results to changes in F, table 5 revisits table 2 with
s = 0.30.  Once again, if p0 = pM(c) and F is a fixed fraction of the monopoly rent, the
parameters a, b, and c have no effect on the welfare comparisons.
The results in table 5 are less dramatic than those of table 4, since s is onstrained to a
moderate level.  Throughout table 5, H outperforms ISS in both consumer surplus and total
surplus, though both mechanisms do less well as the firm’s costs rise.  Total surplus under
ISS (Hagerman) may fall below 85% (91%) of the second-best, while the consumer surplus
share of second-best welfare may fall below 80% (87%)of second-best welfare.
Finally, table 6 examines performance as the pre-reform price goes gradually from
marginal cost to the monopoly price, taking s = .30 and holding F at 100% of monopoly
earnings.  The results in the table are very different from those that would appear when
s = 0.  Now, the performance of ISS declines as the pre-reform price increases.  For H,
welfare increases as the pre-reform markup rises to 70% of the monopoly markup, and then
declines again.  Similarly, the relative consumer surplus from H increases as the initial
markup rises to 50% of the monopoly level, and then declines.  This relationship can be seen
directly in (7) and (8), which are both concave in p0 for s ∈ [.18,.54].  The implication is that
when s > 0, the relative performance of ISS improves when p0 is less than 80% of the
monopoly price.
Taken together, the results of this section suggest that Hagerman’s modification of the
V-F mechanism may well outperform ISS in practice.  For example, table 6 shows that if the
pre-reform markup is 20% of the monopoly markup, s = .30, and F is 100% of the one-shot
monopoly rent, then H generates roughly 3% greater welfare and 4% greater consumer
surplus than ISS.  This performance difference declines if F is only 50% of monopoly rent,
in which case additional calculations show that H generates only about 1.7% more welfare
and 1.8% more consumer surplus.  In a sense, then, the overall message of the numerical
results may be that the two mechanisms produce surprisingly similar performance levels for
wide ranges of the exogenous parameters.
F ISS H ISS H
0% .940 .964 .916 .946
10% .936 .962 .910 .943
20% .931 .959 .904 .939
30% .926 .956 .897 .934
40% .920 .952 .889 .929
50% .913 .948 .879 .922
60% .904 .943 .867 .915
70% .894 .937 .852 .905
80% .881 .929 .834 .894
90% .865 .920 .812 .879
100%  .843 .907 .782 .860
Table 6.  Numerical Results for β = 0.9, s = 0.3, and F = 100% of monopoly earnings
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5.  Conclusions
This paper has compared two prominent non-Bayesian regulatory mechanisms, focusing on
the case of a single-product firm facing linear demand.  There are three main findings.  First,
the two mechanisms are equally vulnerable to abuse.  Second, when subsidies to the firm
can be financed in a relatively non-distortionary manner, the ISS mechanism Pareto-domi-
nates Hagerman’s modification of the Vogelsang-Finsinger mechanism.  Third, for a wide
range of reasonable estimates of the cost of making transfers to the firm, the Hagerman
mechanism generates greater consumer surplus and total welfare than does ISS.  In principle,
the Hagerman mechanism can generate consumer surplus levels more than 40% greater than
those of ISS when fixed costs are large and transfers are very costly.  For most plausible
parameter values, however, the quantitative difference in performance between the two
mechanisms is likely to be modest.
This paper provides only a first look at the comparative performance of alternative
non-Bayesian mechanisms.  Intensive simulation work might allow the analysis of more
general cost and demand functions in the context of a multiproduct firm.  Additional work
might also study in more detail how particular sources of the shadow cost of transfers affect
the choice between non-Bayesian mechanisms.  For example, when a reduced customer base
is the primary concern, the mechanisms might be extended to incorporate optional tariffs or
lifeline rates for low-demand customers.  A particularly important topic for further work is
the effects of non-stationary costs and demand on mechanism performance.26 Meaningful
comparisons, however, will require that the mechanisms be extended to make them less
vulnerable to factor price increases.  Possible modifications include the use of automatic
adjustment mechanisms (like the fuel adjustment clauses in many electric utility rate
structures) to pass through actual cost increases,27 adjustment of prices to reflect expected
rates of inflation and technological change (e.g., the RPI − X scheme proposed in Littlechild
(1983)), or profit-based review of the firm.  Each of these procedures is likely to have its
own problems, however, among them the reduction of incentives for productive efficiency
and/or the introduction of adverse selection problems into the regulatory process.  Neverthe-
less, such an analysis is needed to establish whether non-Bayesian mechanisms can be
expected to perform well in practice.
Appendix 1
An explicit solution for the firm’s optimal pricing path under the Hagerman mechanism can
be found for the case of linear demand with Ct(qt) = F + ctqt.  Let p0,t be the “service
payment” in period t; I place no constraints on the sign of the service payment, so as to
facilitate comparison between ISS and the Hagerman mechanism. Constraint (1) now
becomes (pt − pt+1)q(pt) + p0,t − p0,t+1 ≥ (pt − ct)q(pt) − F + p0,t. Rearranging terms and us-
ing the equality (since the firm always selects prices where the constraint binds) yields
p0,t+1 = − (pt+1 − ct)q(pt) − F, so that the optimal service payment can be expressed in terms
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26 Stefos (1990) has taken some steps in this direction.
27 Vogelsang (1989) explicitly proposes such a measure.
of the per unit price.  Substituting this into the expression for the firm’s earnings yields
Rt = (p1,t − ct)q(p1,t) − (p1,t − ct−1)q(p1,t−1).  Notation can now be simplified, since the
service payment has been eliminated from the expression, by writing simply pt for p1,t.  The











 V0 = ∑βt
t=0
∞
[(pt − ct)q(pt) − (pt − ct−1)q(pt−1)] (9)
The first-order conditions are
∂V0
∂pt
 = βt[q(pt) − q(pt−1) + (pt − ct)q′(pt) − β(pt+1 − ct)q′(pt)] = 0,    for all t ≥ 1 (10)
which imply
q(pt) − q(pt−1) + q′(pt)[(pt−ct) − β(pt+1 − ct)] = 0,    for all t ≥ 1. (11)
When demand is linear, i.e., q(p) = a − bp, the above become second-order difference
equations with constant coefficients:
βpt+1 − 2pt + pt−1 + (1 − β)ct = 0,    for all t ≥ 1. (12)
Suppose costs are constant over time, so ct = c for all t.  Then (12) can be solved explicitly
using standard dynamic methods.28 Boundary conditions are given by p0, and the transver-
sality condition (from Hagerman’s proof) limt → ∞ pt = c.  Postulating a solution to the
corresponding homogeneous equation of the form pt = λt and using the boundary conditions
yields λ = (1 ⁄ β) [1 − √1 − β ].  A solution to the non-homogeneous equation (12) is then
pt = c for all t; combining this with the homogeneous solution shows the optimal price
sequence is pt = p0λt + (1 − λt)c, or alternatively, pt = λpt−1 + (1 − λ)c.  Thus, price is a
geometric sequence that decreases from p0 to c.
Appendix 2
Proposition 1.  When the service payment under the Hagerman mechanism is unconstrained
in sign, the level of abuse in each period, At, is the solution to B′(At) = 1 − β, as it
is under ISS. 
Proof:  Paralleling the analysis of Appendix 1, let p0,t be the “service payment” in period t
and pt be a vector of the firm’s other prices.  Constraint (1) now becomes
(pt − pt+1)q(pt) + p0,t − p0,t+1 ≥ ptq(pt) − Ct(q(pt)) − At + p0,t.  Rearranging terms
and using the equality (since the firm always selects prices where the constraint
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28 See Chiang (1984).
binds) yields p0,t+1 = − pt+1q(pt) + Ct(q(pt)) + At.  Substituting this into the expres-
sion for the f irm’s earnings yields Rt = ptq(pt) − Ct(q(pt))
− ptq(pt−1) − Ct−1(q(pt−1)) + At−1 − At, and the firm’s payoff in period t is



















 V0 = ∑ 
t=0
∞
βt[ptq(pt) − Ct(q(pt)) − ptq(pt−1) − Ct−1(q(pt−1)) + At−1 − At + B(At)] (13)
The first-order conditions for abuse are
∂V0
∂At
 = βt[B′(At) − 1 + β] = 0,    for all t ≥ 1. (14)
Thus, the firm selects a constant level of abuse over time which is given by
B′(At) = 1 − β.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2.  Suppose the shadow cost of transfers is zero, and β ∈ (0,1).  Then (a)
ΠISS > ΠH, (b) WISS > WH, and (c) CSISS > (<) CSH if β > (<) .5.






1 − √1 − β
  .
Combining terms reveals that ΠH ⁄ ΠISS < 1 is equivalent to ϕ(β) ≡
2√1 − β  − 2 + β < 0.  Now note that ϕ′(β) = 1 − 1 ⁄ √1 − β  < 0.  Thus, if ϕ(0) < 0,
then ϕ(β) < 0 for all β ∈ [0,1].  It is easy to see that ϕ(0) = 0.  (b) For s = 0,
comparison of (5) and (8) shows that








Direct calculat ion shows that λ2 ⁄ (1 − λ2β) = (2 − β − 2√1 − β) /
(2β√1 − β  [1 − √1 − β ]), the sign of which is simply the sign of 2 − β − 2√1 − β
for β < 1.  But 2 − β − 2√1 − β  > 0 is equivalent to (2 − β)2 > 4(1 − β), which
reduces to β2 > 0.  (c) From (4) and (7), and the definition of λ, 
















 [− 1 + 1
β
 + 1 − 2√1 − β
2β − 2 + 2√1 − β
] .
Define ψ(β) ≡ (5β ⁄ 2 − 1 − β2 + [1 − 2β] √1 − β).  Some tedious algebra shows
that sgn (CSISS − CSH) = sgn ψ(β).  A direct check shows that ψ(1 ⁄ 2) = 0.  Numeri-
cal calculations (available from the author) show that ψ(β) < 0 for β < .5 and
ψ(β) > 0 for  β > .5.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3.  Suppose the shadow cost of transfers is zero.  Then ΠISS − ΠH and
WISS − WH is (a) increasing in the initial price p0, (b) increasing in the absolute
value of the slope of the demand curve b, and (c) decreasing in the firm’s marginal
cost c; if β > .5, then (a)−(c) hold for consumer surplus as well. 
Proof:  Note that 



















while similar expressions for WISS − WH and CSISS − CSH are given above.  Since
the term b(p0 − c)2 factors out of all three expressions, the proposition follows
immediately.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.  Suppose the shadow cost of transfers is zero, and that the firm would be
viable as an unregulated monopoly, i.e., (pM − c)q(pM) − F ≥ 0.  Then
WH ⁄ WISS ≥ .875. 
Proof:  Comparing (5) and (8) shows that 
WH
WISS








This expression can be simplified.  Recall that ω∗ = (a − bc)2 ⁄ 2b.  Note also that
the relative performance of H falls with p0; hence, assume p0 = pM = (a + bc) ⁄ 2b.
Finally, requiring that πM ≥ 0 implies that  (a − bc)2 ⁄ 4b − F ≥ 0, so
F ≤ (a − bc)2 ⁄ 4b.  From (15) it is clear that H performs worse when F is larger, so
assume F = (a − bc)2 ⁄ 4b. Now (15) reduces to 
WH
WISS






Some tedious calculations show that (1 − β)λ2 ⁄ (1 − λ2β) is decreasing in β and that
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limβ → 0 (1 − β)λ2 ⁄ (1 − λ2β) = .25.  Hence WH ⁄ WISS ≥ .875.
Q.E.D.
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